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ARISTOTLE, AQUINAS & KANT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS
[I]nequality is generally at the bottom of internal warfare in
states, for it is in their striving for what is fair and equal that men
become divided.
-Aristotle, The Politics, Book V, ch. 1.
Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just from being
right according to the rule of reason ...
-St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, 96.
[M]an . . . exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means
to be arbitrarily used by this or that will....
-Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals,
2d sec.
I. INTRODUCTION
The intent of this article, as the title indicates, is to explore
what such philosophers on the law as Aristotle, St. Thomas Aqui-
nas, and Immanuel Kant had to say in the area of human rights.
To be sure, the selection of these three political thinkers was not
one of chance, for their writings on the law have ever been drawn
upon, directly and indirectly, by the greatest of jurists. For exam-
ple, legal ideas expressed by publicists and constitutional lawyers
on natural law may be traced back to a common source in the
philosophy of the pagan Aristotle, as well as that of the scholastic
theologican, St. Thomas. Indeed, for Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant
alike, legal philosophy was a topic of central import.'
Particularly relative to the question here of human rights, these
three philosophers would all agree that in understanding oneself as
a human person one sees what he ought realize in order to actualize
himself as a person in his free acts, both those which are internal
and those which affect the world.2 Additionally, each further
shared the belief that man, as a creature endowed with the capacity
of reasoning, would, in choosing between alternative courses of
action, employ some standard by which he rejected those acts he
regarded as "bad," while accepting those he regarded as "good." ' 3
I. M. COHEN, REASON AND LAW 1, 10-11, 101 (1950) [hereinafter cited as COHEN].
2. Rommen, In Defense of Natural Law, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 114 (S. Hook ed.
1964) [hereinafter cited as In Defense of Natural Law].
3. Friedman, An Analysis of"In Defense of Natural Law," in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY
147 (S. Hook ed. 1964).
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In this paper the thoughts of Aristotle, St. Thomas, and Kant
will be treated separately to examine not only the similarities, but
the dissimilarities as well, in their respective approaches toward
human rights.
II. THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF GREAT PHILOSOPHERS ON THE LAW
A. Aristotle
In his "Letter from Birmingham City Jail," dated April 16,
1963, Dr. Martin Luther King, paraphrasing an Aristotelian prin-
ciple, wrote that equals should be treated equally; Aristotle, how-
ever, made a distinction between the justice of which Dr. King
spoke and another, more fundamental justice. 4
His thoughts serving as a model for all future discourses on the
subject, 5 Aristotle viewed justice as neither exclusively ethical nor
confined to morality; rather, it meant that which was adequate,
fitting exactly into relation with something else.6 To be differen-
tiated were the two objects of justice: that which is naturally just
and that which is legally just.7 Although they were in constant
conflict, 8 Aristotle was convinced that the latter wished to realize
the former.9 In his words, "Justice According to Nature is...
better than Justice According to Law."'"
In this famous distinction, natural justice, being one of the
constituent elements," by nature, transcended the order of volun-
tary action.' 2 Being the product of rational order, this type of
justice was in accord with nature and, thus, universal 3 with regard
to laws and requirements of society in.general, 4 including both
public law and rights of property and possession. 5 It was funda-
mental law, a higher law-unwritten, eternal and unchangeable,
4. Id. at 154.
5. J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 113 (1964).
6. Y. SIMON, THE TRADITION OF NATURAL LAW 41-42 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
SIMON].
7. H. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 17 (1959) [hereinafter cited as ROMMEN].
8. C. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 23 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as HAINES].
9. ROMMEN at 19.
10. W. SEAGLE, THE HISTORY OF LAW 370 (1946) [hereinafter cited as SEAGLE].
11. Id. at 200.
12. SIMON at 41-42.
13. HAINES at 6-7, 23.
14. R. POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 4-5 (1958) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE].
15. J. ZANE, THE STORY OF LAW 120-21 (1927).
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common to all regardless of source. 6 It had the same force every-
where, 7 or, as Aristotle analogized in his 4th century B.C. Ethics,
"the fire burns the same both here and in Persia."'"
Whereas natural justice was complete virtue, the other particu-
lar justice was a special kind of virtue concerned with equality. 9
According to the Ethics, this justice in its idea could only be just
with respect to those things which were by nature indifferent.20 The
law of such conventional justice was solely derived from the enact-
ment of positive legislation, whence came its title to be "just. '21
Being local, ordinary laws applicable to a particular place and to
each separate community, these imperative, positive, man-made
enactments were designed to meet the contingencies of the
moment.22
Aristotle, in influencing the mold of the classical doctrine of
natural rights in criminal law (not to mention the other branches
of law), distinguished those acts which were crimes by nature (mala
per se), and thus prohibited among all people, from those which
were prohibited only in certain places by special legislation. 2
Furthering his effective use of dualism,24 Aristotle divided this
second category of particular justice into distributive and correc-
tive justices2 -the former being defined in terms of rights and
duties apportioned to each party and the latter in terms of func-
tions for redress or the enforcement of rights. Today, perhaps,
these could be equated, respectively, with substantive laws, setting
down actual rights and wrongs, and adjective laws, setting forth the
methods and procedures to obtain redress and enforce the righting
of wrongs.2 6
Where the original distribution of justice had a defect and
needed to be righted, corrective justice was called for. The object
of virtue in this communicative justice was to render to everyone
16. HAINES at 6-7, 23.
17. SEAGLE at 370.
18. E. PATTERSON, LAW IN A SCIENTIFIC AGE 4 (1963).
19. JUSTICE at 4-5.
20. R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 25 (1922) [hereinafter
cited as PHILOSOPHY OF LAW].
21. Id.; SEAGLE at 370.
22. HAINES at 7.
23. COHEN at 19.
24. SEAGLE at 370.
25. JUSTICE at 4.
26. J. ZANE, supra note 15, at 120.
[Vol. 55
COMMENTARY
as nearly as possible that which belonged to him.27 Aristotle had
identified virtue as a mean between extremes, the quality of virtue
here being that every man was to receive his due of justice outside
legality. The law was, thus, supplemented by the principle of eq-
uity, or rule by humane exception, as the concepts of grace and
leniency were introduced to justice.2s Another kind of jus-
tice-epieckeia-involving the application of fairness and reasona-
bleness to legal rules, was thus born.29 Because "law falls short of
what is required by the universal terms in which it is set forth,"30
equity (or fairness) was needed to correct this shortcoming.
Recognizing that no system was entirely perfect and that posi-
tive laws, inasmuch as they did not fit all cases, necessarily exhib-
ited imperfections, Aristotle saw that equity was required to over-
come the deficiencies of formal law through natural law, applied
by the judge,31 whose business it was to fix punishments and penal-
ties equally for all in accord with the rule of law.12
Of the duality, however, the most important feature was the
doctrine of distributive justice, on the basis of which political rights
were distributed by the legislator,3 in a process much like that
in which scarce goods (both material and intangible) are handed
out to competing groups and persons according to accepted notions
of merit.3 1 With each being judged equally with his fellow man
according to merit, the guiding idea for equality thus became one
of proportion based upon merit 35-the better getting more of what
was good and each getting that which benefited him.3 1
To Aristotle, rights could only exist between those who were
free and equal before the state.3 7 Equality, the basic criterion for
political justice, was to be found among men who shared their lives
in community, thus being both free and equal "either proportion-
ally or arithmetically. ' 3 Essentially, justice was something
27. JUSRICE at 5, 9.
28. B. CARDOZA, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 38-39 (1927).
29. J. ZANE, supra note 15, at 121, 225.
30. SEAGLE at 182.
31. ROMMEN at 18.
32. JUSTICE at 9.
33. Id. at 5.
34. J. SHKLAR, supra note 5, at 115.
35. JUSTICE at 9.
36. M. HAMBURGER, MORALS AND THE LAW: THE GROWTH OF ARISTOTLE'S LEGAL
THEORY 135 (1951) [hereinafter cited as HAMBURGER].
37. JUSTICE at 9.
38. HAMBURGER at 58.
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human; man was, of course, human, and, as to sources of political
organization and justice, justice existed between people re-
lated39-the relationship being that of man with fellowman, gov-
erned by ethics." Since human life was always a social existence,
Aristotle deduced that man was the "social animal,"'" as well as
zoon politikon, the political animal-a gregarious, household ani-
mal, who, when lonely, tended toward partnership with those to
whom he was akin by nature.42 Man, by his very essence, being a
rational creature 3 was guided by reason toward attainment of
that for which he was striving.4 His goal, which Aristotle spoke
of as "virtue," could only be achieved as a citizen of a state, or
polis, through obedience of its laws. In his firm belief of the excel-
lence of the existing laws of the polis, 45 Aristotle rejected Plato's
idea that there could be a law antecedent or superior to the law of
existing society.4" No goal transcended the ideal of the polis,
against which no right of a citizen could be admitted.47 Concerned
as he was with goodness and its reality in the state,48 Aristotle saw
as the end of the polis the good life by means of the institutions of
social life.4
Indeed, Aristotle averred that a good man may not be the same
as a good citizen, for only in a state could the good man and the
good citizen be absolutely identified.50 There alone could man "re-
alize his moral destiny." The individual who was apart from the
state was looked upon by Aristotle as the "most malignant and
dangerous of beasts."15 ' He who is "without polis by reason of his
own nature" was a human beast worse than any animal, a brutish
man and barbarian not found among other men because he was
beyond true human nature; he stood outside of human society in
violation of the very concept of "man. 52 Because of this, Aristotle
39. Id. at 86, 135.
40. RoMMEN at 32.
41. J. ZANE, supra note 15, at 2.
42. HAMBURGER at 58.
43. C. CURTIS, IT'S YOUR LAW 131-32 (1954).
44. A. Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 237 (1954).
45. ROMMEN at 18-19.
46. SEAGLE at 202.
47. ROMMEN at 18.
48. J. ZANE, supra note 15, at 13.
49. HAMBURGER at 169.
50. Id. at 43.
51. JUSTICE at 9.
52. HAMBURGER at 85, 89.
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preferred the established rule of law, which he recognized as ema-
nating from the state,53 to that of any individual man:54 if man
himself were to rule he would add the character of the beast to
pervert even the best man. Thus, Aristotle praised constitution-
alism for the rule of law (reason sans passion) and fair equality.55
A constitutional system-of-laws rule would not suffer from per-
sonal caprice. Then, for those for whom such laws were en-
acted-the members of a state-there was legal justice, but not for
those who were nonmembers.17
Justice in the state demanded a unanimity in which mutual
rights would not be violated and each would keep in his appointed
sphere. Inequality arose between individual men in their differ-
ences of worth and capacity for the things which the social order
called for .5 For example, on the subject of manual labor, Aristotle,
seemingly overwhelmed by the separation of the skilled hand and
technical judgment, at times implied that one who worked with his
hands to shape physical nature according to human desires worked
merely out of routine, his actions proceeding from nonrational
habits. Such acts Aristotle likened to the way fire burns in his
under-evaluation of manual laborers. Like weaknesses are also
said to be found in Aristotle's discussion of slavery. 9
Aristotle tried to justify the belief that certain men, incapable
of being eduated to virtue were by nature unfit for citizenship."
Due to their psychosomatic structure, these men could not truly
determine themselves by reason and, thus, were ruled by their
passions instead. Because of this, they ought to be ruled in the form
of ownership as slaves, maintained Aristotle, by those who were
nimbler of mind.61 Slaves by nature were, therefore, men who could
obey reason, although they were unable to exercise it." From Aris-
totle on, these justifications were voiced in defense of slavery. 3
53. THE RULE OF LAW 5, 26 (A. HARDING ed. 1961).
54. A. SUTHERLAND, GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW 118 (1956).
55. HAMBURGER at 59.
56. J. ZANE, supra note 15, at 123.
57. HAMBURGER at 58.
58. JUSTICE at 9; PHILOSOPHY OF LAW at 82.
59. SIMON at 29, 81.
60. ROMMEN at 9, 32.
61. In Defense of Natural Law at 115. St. Thomas Aquinas tried to explain slavery as
a consequence of sin.
62. SIMON at 117 n.2.
63. In Defense of Natural Law at 115.
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Indeed, some historians have accused Aristotle with influencing the
idealogy of American slavery. Margaret Coit, Calhoun's biogra-
pher, has written that the South Carolinian statesman's low esti-
mation of the mental potentialities of Negroes was the result of his
being steeped in Aristotelian philosophy. 4 Yet, Aristotle advo-
cated a humane exercise of the rule of the master:
There is. . . community of interest, and a relation of friendship
between master and slave, when both of them naturally merit the
position in which they stand.6
This humanitarianism led him to regard a slave as more a man
than a living tool; surely, a slave had more reason than a child,
whom one had but to command." In fact, Aristotle did see an
injustice in'slavery based on "conquest" or "force of law," al-
though he did distinguish it from slavery "by nature." 7 However,
there is reason to suspect that Aristotle was evidently uncomfort-
able with his argument for slavery, since in his will he freed his
slaves. 8 In arranging for their freedom, Aristotle was true to his
words when he wrote that "it is wise to offer all slaves the eventual
reward of emancipation.""
B. St. Thomas Aquinas
Aristotle's philosophy was influential in developing the charac-
ter of law and justice that was to follow.70 Respectfully referring
to Aristotle as "the Philosopher," St. Thomas Aquinas was one of
those feeling this influence, as evidenced by his teachings and writ-
ings during the Middle Ages, while constructing his "imposing
edifice" ot scholasticism' '-and particularly in his works reaffirm-
ing the idea of justice as a general virtue.72 While admitting to the
two kinds of justice defined by Aristotle, 3 St. Thomas took Aris-
totle's analysis and moved toward the first secularization of the
64. SIMON at 117 n.2.
65. HAMBURGER at 139.
66. Id.
67. SIMON at 117 n.2.
68. In Defense of Natural Law at 115.
69. HAMBURGER at 139.
70. A. Ross, supra note 44, at 237.
71. HAMBURGER at 156.
72. G. DEL VECCHIO, JUSTICE 24 (1953).
73. Id. at 35.
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idea of justice.74 Giving as he did a more precise interpretation of
Aristotle's theory, 75 Aquinas enriched and synthesized the Greek
master's philosophy.76
St. Thomas looked upon justice as a divine virtue, which, like
other virtues, found its existence in God Himself as a perfect exam-
ple. In relation to true and formal justice, however, there could be
no place for man, as God's creation, with Him, even though man
had fulfilled his duties to God, for while God may give any man
his due, He is still not a debtor-and, above all, the disparity and
infinite distance between God and man makes it impossible' for any
proper justice.7 Yet, for man, justice meant duties to other men
and it so directed him in these relations in a two-fold way: first,
toward individuals, and, second, toward others in general (i.e., the
community). Continually speaking of the function of circumstan-
ces. in determining the reasonableness of the law for executing
justice directed at the common good,7 St. Thomas, in his Summa
Theologica, saw the law as "an ordinance of reason for the com-
mon good, promulgated and emanting from Him who has care of
the community"-God. 79
Defining law as a rule and measure of human action," St.
Thomas, in his Treatise on Law, divided human law into "just"
and "unjust," and then subdivided those classes into one species
contrary to divine will and another in conflict only with human
well-being.8 Here, returning again to the "Letter from Birming-
ham City Jail," Dr. King, in his resistance to Southern segregation
laws on the basis of their being unjust, specifically mentioned
Aquinas when he wrote: "[A]n unjust law is a human law not
rooted in eternal and natural law.' 82
Far superior to human law, 3 natural law, as a part of eternal
law, was, to Aquinas, the primary law from which all others were
74. JUSTICE at 18-19.
75. G. DEL VECCHIO, supra note 72, at 62.
76. ROMMEN at 31.
77. G. DEL VECCHIO, supra note 72, at 9, 14, 29.
78. ROMMEN at 206, 255.
79. Nielson, The Myth of Natural Law, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 243, 246 (S. Hook
ed. 1964); SIMON at 109.
80. SIMON at 71. The distinction between law and rules of law in modern legal science
can be traced back to Aquinas. PHILOSOPHY OF LAW at 25-26. These rules, or national laws,
were designed for human ends, subject to change as human condition varied. HAINES at 13.
81. G. DEL VECCHIO, supra note 72, at 160.
82. Friedman, supra note 3, at 152.
83. SEAGLE at 202.
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derivedl-bonum est faciendum, malum vitandum.9 In Summa
Theologica he described natural law as "the light of natural reason
whereby we discern what is good and what is evil. '86 It was the
natural law, as much as the principle of identity was the principle
of reason." Because man was a rational creature who applied the
eternal law to human affairs by distinguishing the good from the
bad, 88 it was inevitable that natural, law should result and that man
could apprehend all this with unaided reason 9 (though Aquinas
believed the circumstances of climate might prevent the develop-
ment of reason in some men).90 Concluded St. Thomas: "Whatever
the particular reason naturally apprehends as man's good belongs
to the precepts of natural law.""1
It was St. Thomas' understanding that the human person was
the free master of his person, but subsisted by and in himself.
Freedom of conscience was undeniable-even to the point where
Aquinas recognized religions for Jews and Saracens92 Judgment
was left to people in immediate situations to act accordingly,9 3
with natural law serving as the basis. Although positive laws and
actions that today may rightly be thought of as criminal were
clearly sanctioned by eternally valid natural law,94 in the Thomistic
division between private and public immorality, the conservative
Thomists denied that sin was a concern of criminal law.95 St.
Thomas, great moralist that he was, would not base what are not
crimes on mere authority, his appeal being to a rational view on
the divine will.98
The judgment to be made or the choice given to man between
good or evil was fixed on an objective order laid down partly by
84. Nielson, supra note 79, at 124, 129.
85. Id. at 124.
86. Oppenheim, The Metaethics of Natural Law, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 243, 246
(S. Hook ed. 1964).
87. SIMoN at 122.
88. HAINES at 13-14.
89. Nielson, supra note 79, at 129.
90. COHEN at 81.
91. Abelson, Unnatural Law, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 170 (S. Hook ed. 1964).
92. In Defense of Natural Law at 113, 119.
93. SIMON at 186 n.17.
94. Baumgardt, Natural Right Valid in Itself & Allegedly Relativistic Endamonism, in
LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 173 (S. Hook ed. 1964).
95. J. SHKLAR, supra note 5, at 45, 49, 87.
96. COHEN at 20.
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universal reason and partly by the Scriptures." Akin to Aristotle's
moral and legal philosophy, St. Thomas viewed the world as striv-
ing toward good, with its own perfection in agreement with God9"
and, thus, felt that human beings were most likely to turn toward
virtuous behavior. Goodness he attributed to God's very reason,
which was interpreted by the Church9 (assuming it was the exclu-
sive interpreter of natural law and of which it stood as guardian
over both state and individual).' Because goodness was not simply
an expression of divine fiat,'0° God's intelligence was thus prior to
His will. So a large part of St. Thomas' philosophy was grounded
in theology'°-and understandably so. He had forcefully identified
the law of nature with the law of God. 103 While the natural law
and rights that Aquinas spoke of were like those of Aristotle (what
is just by nature transcends the order of voluntary action),'0 4 these
ideas were energetically carried on by Catholic churchmen to be
incorporated in final form with the Christian concept of God,
thereby giving a firmer content to natural law.0 5
Also belonging to natural law was the inclination of man not
only to know the truth about God, pertaining to reason, but to live
in society, to associate."0 8 This recognition of the essentially politi-
cal nature of man was a concept Aquinas had derived from Aristo-
tle. Only through the state could man achieve the aforementioned
perfection, for without it, he was unthinkable. 07 It was the full
right of "an earnest, moderate, and reasonable people which cher-
ishes the general welfare" to govern themselves "through republi-
can institutions and freely elected officials." Aquinas, believing
that a state's constitution should be suited to the people's character
and moral vigor, considered the best form of government to be part
kingdom, "wherein one is given power to preside over all," and
part democracy, wherein all are eligible to govern and can choose
97. Friedman, supra note 3, at 146.
98. A. Ross, supra note 44, at 243-44.
99. Friedman, supra note 3, at 146.
100. SEAGLE at 202.
101. Friedman, supra note 3, at 146.
102. Nielson, supra note 79, at 129-30.
103. SEAGLE at 201; HAINES at 13-14.
104. In Defense of Natural Law at 42.
105. A. Ross, supra note 44, at 224-25, 239, 243.
106. ROMMEN at 49; SIMON at 122-24.
107. J. SNEE, Leviathan at the Bar of Justice, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW 94-95
(1956).
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their ruler. As he advised in Summa Theologica, "All should take
some share in government." A constitution of this form, he contin-
ued, w ould ensure peace among the people, commend itself to all,
and be the most enduring.'"
The influence of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas upon the
modern Catholic Church is rather pronounced. Evidencing this
effect are both the writings of jurists hoping to restore natural law
to its former primacy in the legal-political world and the fact that
Thomistic philosophy has served as a basis of instruction adopted
by Church schools and seminaries to this day.'
C. Immanuel Kant
As well as St. Thomas, also influenced by Aristotle's analysis
of law and justice was Immanuel Kant.110 Declaring that "jurists
still seek a definition of their concept of.the law,"'1 Kant was bold
enough to supply one himself. Behind this famous reproach to
jurists was the assumption of legal absolutism-that there could be
but one true or correct definition of an object." 2 To Kant, justice,
which was determined by some ideal, common equality, was a
synthesis of liberty and equality," 3 the "discovery" of which .pro-
vided the basis of law."' This formula was later adopted by Spen-
cer in his law of equal freedom, which was ascertained by observa-
tion in the same way as were physical or chemical laws." 5
Given such an approach to liberty, freedom of the individual
became the starting point in Kant's sytem.'16 Man was born free
and equal.17 Individual liberty or autonomy was the sole right
belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity."8 Viewing man
not merely as a being of nature, but also as a being of freedom in
whose life reason could have a determining influence, Kant looked
not merely to what nature made of man, but, more importantly,
108. ROMMEN at 259, 220.
109. COHEN at 145, 153; HAINES at 278.
110. JUSTICE at 5.
111. SEAGLE at 4-5.
112. COHEN at 65.
113. JUSTICE at 17-18.
114. J. ZANE, supra note 15, at 39.
115. JUSTICE at 26; PHILOSOPHY OF LAW at 219.
116. ROMMEN at 100.
117. JUSTICE at 17-18.
118. ROMMEN at 100.
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to what man could make of himself as a free agent."9 Alone or
jointly, "a person is subject to no other laws than those he gives
himself."1 20 Kant's idea was thus seen in the freely developed and
acting personality.'2' All this caused Ernest Cassier to remark,
"Kant looks for constancy not in what man is but what he should
be." 22
Kant's whole philosophy of liberty exhibited individual natural
law in its highest form.'3 Although he still believed in natural law
(because of the access of practical reason to his metaphysical
world, an access that theoretical reason lacked),2 4 the Aristotelian
concept of nature and its law became the doctrine of Summum
Bonum.12 What was good for nature was relevant to the study of
natural law.2 6 It was the state of nature that was already social,
according to Kant's own theory, with norms of nature law having
force in it as private law.
In trying to accommodate the abstract freedom of will to the
abstract idea of property, Kant (considered by scholars to be the
founder of the metaphysical school'2) undermined the natural
rights foundation of private property. 28 His initial efforts to justify
that above idea to himself gave rise to the metaphysical theories
of property. As always, Kant began with the premise of the inviola-
bility of the individual human personality, stating that a thing
rightfully belongs to a person when he is so connected with it that
anyone else who uses it-sans his consent-does that person an
injury. Furthermore, believing that a contract for property was
alien to and inconsistent with one's substance as involved in the
very idea of individual right, Kant had said it was impossible to
prove one ought to keep his promise of consideration merely as a
promise (however, it should be noted that he did attach an inherent
moral significance to any promise made). An undertaking to per-
form something of that sort might be considered an alienation of
one's services and property. When worked out to completion,
119. SIMON at 184.
120. ROMMEN at 101.
121. B. CARDOZA, supra note 28, at 39.
122. SIMON at 184.
123. ROMMEN at 100.
124. In Defense of Natural Law at 118.
125. COHEN at 130.
126. SIMON at 42.
127. SEAGLE at 23.
128. PHILOSOPHY OF LAw at 210, 203, 260.
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Kant's theory showed a use of the ideas of occupation and com-
pact, the former involving a unilateral pact not to disturb others
in their occupation of other things and the latter based upon a
reconciliation of wills through a universal law, wherein one who
declared his will as to object A was compelled to respect the decla-
ration of his neighbor's will as to object B.111
So there were limits to liberty: the external liberty of each man
was limited by and adjusted to the like liberty of all others. Accord-
ing to Kant's theory of internal morality, as set forth in his
Metaphysical Elements of Justice,130 these external activities of
man were to be distinguished from morals, which were confined to
the development of inner life.' 31 As he advised man, "Act exter-
nally in such a manner that free exercise of thy Will may be able
to co-exist with the freedom of all others. . . ,,3 Law, then,
could be viewed as a system of principles or universal rules to be
applied to human action.' 33 Its end or purpose was the promotion
and maintenance of maximum individual self-assertion. 34 A
course of action was lawful only if the liberty to pursue it was
compatible with the liberty of everyone else. The demand for
equality was, thus, identical with the demand for that general prin-
ciple of freedom wherein conflicting human wills would be recon-
ciled in action under the sum total of conditions . 35 Above all
codes and enactments, this principle was sought to furnish criterion
for establishing the validity of all legal rules. 3'
Kant's theory of the supreme principle expressed in universal
legislation demonstrated his legalistic ethics.3 7 Ethical relations
were involved in the autonomy of free will-and, from the Kantian
view, law itself was a branch of social ethics. 38 Viewing the law
as an eternal idea to which external human conduct ought to con-
129. Id. at 213-14, 260-61.
130. Ladd, Law and Morality: Internalism and Externalism, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY
62-63 (S. Hook ed. 1964). Cardoza, on Kant, wrote that the purity of will was the concern
of morality, while acts, in and of themselves, had no ethical quality apart from will of action.
B. CARDOZA, supra note 28, at 31-32.
131. JUSTICE at 17-18.
132. ROMMEN at 100.
133. PHILOSOPHY OF LAW at 84.
134. JUSTICE at 17-18.
135. A. Ross, supra note 44, at 276.
136. SEAGLE at 10.
137. HAINES at 237.
138. COHEN at 105.
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form, Kant had assumed that the conscience of all rational beings
demanded norms based on authority of intuition or unanimous
consent. Therefore, he believed the law told man what was categor-
ically imperative on society at all times.3 9 In fact, Kant was the
first to recognize that laws, commands, principles, and rules all
belonged to the same family, since they were all expressed in the
imperative mood. 4 Kant said of his Categoric Imperative, "Act
on a maxim which thou canst will to be law universal." '' Hence,
an action was right if it proceeded on such a maxim'---a meta-
moral maxim in the Kantian sense of adopting rules.'
The Categoric Imperative was meant to be unconditional.
Being backed up by threats of punishment, it was, in a sense,
coercive.' Although the Categoric Imperative has been described
as a general "Thou shall not," it must also be remembered that
Kant's was a moral world in which all conduct was governed by
an absolute rule of regularity.4 5 To be sure, the Categoric Impera-
tive could not be used to form universal rules of conduct unless
consideration were given to the consequences of obeying such
rules. 4 ' For this reason, the Categoric Imperative involved not
only universal law but, also, the idea of duty. 47
Kant regarded obedience to the law as an absolute duty, at
times to the extent of putting duty for duty's sake ahead of every-
thing.4 8 This absolutism led Kant to proclaim that one could not
tell a lie under any circumstances-not even to save a human life.
However, when applied to the legal field, this approach was some-
what weakened, as Kant acknowledged exceptions to the duty of
obeying the law, such as in the case of executing a murderer (which
opened the way to speculation that the number of exceptions might
be increased)."4 That a murderer's life could be taken in exchange
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for the life of his victim was the principle of equality of crime and
penalty offered by Kant, but this principle could not be extended.
Because the moral duty not to kill was an absolute duty for both
the individual and the community, Kant refused to prescribe the
death penalty as punishment for dueling, infanticide, or rebellion.
Further still, he hesitated in prescribing the death penalty in any
case where it would not act as a deterrent. Rejecting secular and
sacred authority alike and refusing to determine what specific acts
were criminal and ought to be treated as such, Kant developed a
penal code having an absolute moral base. While it would be unjust
to punish anyone except for a wrong actually committed, 50 a world
would be immoral if actual virtue went unrewarded and sin unpun-
ished-and any immoral or unjust world, in the eyes of Kant, was
not worth preserving. 5'
Of course, the only way to guarantee the realization of innate
liberty and equality was through establishment of a political organ-
ization formed by a social contract, 5 2 a la Rousseau. Liberty, then,
came only through the state, wherein authority of the general will
was made consistent with the perfect freedom of individual will.
While initially predicating certain limits of the state, Kant later
tended toward consenting to practically absolute authority under
the state's ruling forces.'53 For example, Kant, in what may seem
to be a remarkable stance for him to have taken, called for a
prohibition of any inquiry as to how existing government acquired
its authority.'54 Nevertheless, his belief in individualism was strong
enough to keep him from completely following Rosseau's limita-
tions in subordinating individual will to the state. 55 After all,
according to Kant, government to have any claim to morality
must, like law, be based on freedom and aimed at the protection
of individual autonomy."'
III. CONCLUSION
Having examined the thoughts of Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant
in areas related to human rights, those salient ideas might be syn-
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thesized into the following statement: An individual possesses the
freedom to develop his own thoughts, free from orthodox dogma,
to differ in opinion, and to live as he desires provided this freedom
does not impinge upon the rights of others to do the same. To this,
moreover, let there be added the latter-day thoughts of the late
Senator Harry F. Byrd, who admonished, "[A]lways remember
that human freedom is not a gift to man. . . [but] an achievement
by man . . gained by vigilance and struggle."
